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It is not possible to provide a comprehensive account of the educational philosophies and 
theories that fall within the wide-ranging rubric of ‘Eastern philosophy of education’. This 
disclaimer acknowledges the need to be selective, and so in what follows we have chosen to 
focus on certain Eastern traditions that have seemed to provide the most enduring and 
substantive contributions to educational thinking. This inclusionary/exclusionary task should 
not be understood as disavowing other potentially important contributions and traditions (e.g. 
Shintoism, Sikhism, Jainism, Baha’i) nor that the categories ‘Eastern’ and ‘tradition’ can be 
offered without significant reservation.  
Furthermore, the reader would be faced with a bewildering array of ideas without a 
conceptual frame with which to interpret less familiar contexts. We employ Plato’s allegory 
of the cave as the methodological and pedagogical vehicle to frame and to drive the 
discussion that follows because it allows us to explore certain key ontological, 
epistemological and ethical features within our selected Eastern pedagogies, providing the 
balance between meaningful encounter and coherent interpretation. If philosophy is 
concerned with what it means to be human, then philosophers of education are sometimes 
said to take up the question of what it means to become human: humanization. Our traditions 
define humanization through a set of practices and/or understandings. Thus, we will focus our 
attention both on the goal and the practices and processes by which the goal might be 
achieved. Our chapter includes three parts: the first part will briefly introduce key elements of 
2 
 
Plato’s allegory of the cave. Part two will include four sections that examine Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Daoism and Confucianism in turn. It is important to note however, that each of 
these traditions is more of a tree with several branches, reflecting diverse schools of thought. 
This general difficulty becomes severe when discussing Buddhism and Hinduism (the former 
more appropriately conceived as Buddhisms and the latter a broad term that includes several 
belief systems), requiring us to select specific teachings/aspects within each tradition. Part 
three will offer some brief statements that may be surmised from our analysis, pointing to 
shared features of an ‘Eastern philosophy of education’. 
 
PART 1 
1. Plato’s cave allegory 
The allegory of the cave appears at the beginning of the seventh book of Plato’s Republic 
(514a-520a).1 The allegory presents a dualism between ignorance and knowledge, and an 
ascent of the mind that has ontological, epistemological, and ethical significance. The process 
of escape and return to the cave makes the allegory richly symbolic for educationalists. 
Socrates likens the human condition, “in respect of education and its lack” (514a), to that of 
prisoners captive in a cave. The cave represents the sensual, tangible world. It is the only 
world that these prisoners know since they are shackled in such a way that their heads face 
the cave wall onto which shadows are projected. Behind the prisoners is a fire, and between 
the fire and the prisoners is a walkway with a low wall, behind which people walk carrying 
objects or puppets “of men and other living things” (514b). Having no idea of what is going 
                                                     
1 Since the cave allegory follows Plato’s discussion of the metaphor of the sun (507b–509c) and the 
divided line (509d–511e), it seems plausible that the metaphor of the sun sets out our ontological 
condition, the divided line a methodological interpretation of stages of knowledge, and that the concern of 
the cave is primarily epistemological of the process of moving from ignorance to knowledge. 
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on behind them, the prisoners know only what they see, which they take to be reality. 
However, their blindness is twofold. Not only are they unaware of the false nature of the 
shadows, they have no idea that there is a real world that exists outside the cave. The allegory 
goes on to elaborate how one of the prisoners is forced to turn his eyes towards the fire that is 
casting the shadows. He is then pulled further toward the cave entrance, and taken outside of 
the cave, leading to the dual realization of Truth that is at one and the same time the falsity of 
the cave-world. The freed prisoner is Plato's ideal 'educated person' – the philosopher that has 
escaped the world of temporary, constantly changing appearances and has realized the world 
of ideal forms that are eternal, absolute and unchanging Truths. The freed prisoner then 
returns to try, unsuccessfully, to educate his former inmates of the poverty of their condition. 
The most common reading of the allegory is dualist in which the sensual world is one of 
ignorance, and the world outside the cave illuminated by the light of the sun is of reason and 
true knowledge. Metaphors of the ascent of the mind from ignorance to knowledge are a 
common trope within the Western tradition, found, for example, in Moses’ ascent and 
encounter with Yahweh on Mount Sinai in Exodus, as well as the Neoplatonic influence on 
Western mystical theology in figures such Augustine, Bonaventure and others (Turner 1995). 
Such metaphors of ascent from shadows to light seem to affirm a dualism between body and 
mind, where the world of ideas and reason endures, while the body and the sensual realm in 
general is destined to pass away. The idea that true being exists in a timeless transcendent 
realm can be detected in most forms of religious and philosophical expression. Since 
Nietzsche, Western philosophers have been increasingly suspicious of the identity between 
being and the timeless, though Eastern traditions, as we shall see, also have varied and 
complex relations to the dualism behind the ascent from body to mind (or, relatedly, from 
matter to spirit). In general terms, Buddhism and Hinduism lend themselves more directly to 
images of ascent from the mutable to the immutable yet in ways that challenge the 
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substantiality of the dualism of the cave allegory. Consequently, the allegory of the cave will 
be used in different ways, sometimes as illustrative, and other times as a contrast against 
which Eastern ideas can be explored. The main questions we will attempt to address in this 
reading 'with and against' the cave allegory will be: What are the problems of the human 
condition such that require education (in the cave allegory's terms, what does each tradition 
present as the state of being a prisoner? What characterizes our cave-world)? What kind of 
practices (educative path/curriculum) are offered to ameliorate this problem and what are 
their aims (corresponding with, what parallels the philosophers' way out of the cave, the 
nature of the world outside the cave, and the philosophers' ethical choice to return to the cave 
and free the prisoners)?   
Interpretations of the ethical themes found within the cave allegory are varied and complex. 
On the face of it, the good life seems to entail an escape from the cave such that the form of 
the good, symbolized by the sun, is apprehended directly. It should be remembered that, in 
Plato’s allegory, the philosopher who is freed returns to the cave in order to free the others 
who remain trapped. This final aspect of the story speaks of an important ethical call, but also 
of an educational task. Having offered a brief characterization of Plato’s allegory, we now 
move to examine our four Eastern traditions in order to see the ways in which they relate to 
the story. 
 
PART 2 
 
2.1 Buddhism: The cave as a creation of the mind  
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The interest in Eastern philosophies of education in the passing decades is becoming more 
noticeable (Eppert & Wang, 2008; Ergas & Todd, 2016) yet within these traditions it is 
Buddhism that seems to be drawing the most attention (Hattam, 2004; Hyland, 2014; Todd, 
2015). The reasons for this specific interest are diverse and cannot be elaborated here. 
However, we will mention two important aspects that help locate what we intend to offer 
here: a) Buddhism is essentially an educative tradition (Thurman, 2006). Its foundational 
teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths, are structured and organized in a way that makes it, 
at least theoretically, applicable to a direct discussion of ontological, epistemological, 
existential and ethical questions that lie at the heart of education. b) The dramatic rise in the 
contemporary research of mindfulness practice and its growing applications in schools invite 
both the examination of the roots of the practice within Buddhism, and a philosophical 
perspective on the ways in which such meditative practice and its contemporary 
interpretations are shaping educational theory and practice (O'Donnell, 2015). 
  
2.1.1 Background 
 
Buddhism begins with Siddhattha Gotama (not yet the Buddha) who lived between 563 to 
483 BCE. The Buddha was raised as a prince yet at the age of twenty-nine he set out to live 
as an ascetic, renouncing his luxurious life and leaving his wife and child. This was the 
consequence of a series of life-changing encounters, sending him away in search of an 
answer to 'why we suffer?'. For six years, the Buddha roamed India with groups of ascetics, 
practicing various kinds of meditations, and yogic practices, fasting to near death, yet to no 
avail. Disappointed yet determined, he left his group and sat to meditate vowing to continue 
the practice until he found the answer he sought. Throughout the night he meditated until he 
became the 'Buddha' – the awakened one. What did he awaken from? What did the Buddha 
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find that night and what does it have to do with education and philosophy of education? What 
parallels do we find between the Buddha, Socrates and the cave allegory?  
 
It is important to begin by saying that the Buddha did not initiate Buddhism. After his 
enlightenment, he spent the rest of his life teaching, yet Buddhism took its more organized 
form only in the centuries that followed as the Buddha's teaching were written. This led to the 
development of different schools of thought to the point at which there is no one Buddhism 
but rather many different and diverse Buddhisms (Gethin, 1998). A common division 
includes early Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism (from which Vajrayana as well as Zen 
Buddhism emerged). In our analysis, we will focus on fundamental teachings that are usually 
accepted by all Buddhist schools of thought. 
 
2.1.2 The human condition  
 
The foundational teaching of Buddhism to which all its diverse schools of thought subscribe 
is known as the Four Noble Truths that is repeated a number of times throughout the 
Buddhist Pali canon.2 The Buddhist tradition at times compares the Buddha to a physician in 
the way he articulated The Four Noble Truths revealing a structure of a medical diagnosis 
(Gethin, 1998, p. 63) that we apply here to an educational path:  
 
(1) The First Noble Truth – dukkha is often translated as 'suffering' or perhaps more 
appropriately – dis-ease. This dis-ease may be the equivalent of the prisoners' condition in 
Plato's cave proposing the need for education. This epistemological condition of ignorance, 
                                                     
2 See Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (The Discourse That Sets Turning the Wheel of Truth, Samyutta 
Nikaya 56.11), Maha-parinibbana Sutta (Last Days of the Buddha, Digha Nikaya 16), Mahasaccaka Sutta 
(The Greater Discourse to Saccaka, Majjhima Nikaya 36)  
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symbolized by the cave is, however, created by our own minds through uneducated 
perception (Gethin, 1998, p. 70). Human dis-ease manifests in our being possessed by a 
constant dissatisfaction. We are beset by a restlessness of either wanting things that we do not 
have (e.g., money, house, spouse, tenure), or wishing to disown things that we do (e.g., 
sickness, job interview, problematic relationship). Even when seemingly satisfied, 
undergirding satisfaction is the wish to prolong satisfaction hence 'satisfaction' itself holds the 
seed of dissatisfaction.  
(2) The Second truth – samudaya (origin/cause) – locates the source of the human problem 
within the uneducated human mind that suffers from ignorance (avijja).3 The 'educational' 
responsibility then focuses on liberating the mind from an epistemological error (Olendzki, 
2011). Our minds witness the world of appearances (just as the prisoners in the cave), yet 
with every appearance the mind superimposes its cravings/aversions over perception. As 
Gethin writes, “craving goes hand in hand with a fundamental ignorance and 
misapprehension of the nature of the world” (1998, p. 73). Very much like the cave allegory, 
we confuse appearances with 'things as such'. Acting upon such false perception our morality 
becomes ignorance-laden. Two interesting aspects of avijja help further elaborate the second 
truth as well as point to parallels and distinctions between Plato and the Buddha:  
a) The understanding of Ignorance. The etymology of the term a-vijja reveals a 
parallel between Plato and the Buddha that runs as a thread through Buddhism, Yoga 
and Daoism. Vijja connotes with knowledge but a-vijja is not lack of knowledge but 
rather its negation. We are thus not speaking of ignorance as a lacking of knowledge 
but rather as holding views that are the opposite of right knowledge. This aligns 
clearly with Socrates's preference of unknowing (aporia) over the holding of wrong 
                                                     
3 The cause of dukkha is associated with ignorance (avijja) or with craving (tanha). Both are possible entry 
points within the twelve-fold cycle of dependent origination (Loy, 1988). Here we leaned toward the 
former given the clearer linkage to the cave allegory.  
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views. The ideal of knowing in both cases then is the liberation from viewing 
appearances (doxa) as if they are real.  
b) Dualism vs. non-dualism. The difference between Plato and the Buddha lies in the 
relationship between the 'two worlds'. Whereas in Plato's allegory there is an 
emphasis on the 'world of appearances' against a 'world of forms' the flavor one gets 
within Buddhism, especially in its later Mahayana interpretations, is one that stresses 
the co-dependence of the knower and the known (a theme that will be stressed in the 
section discussing Yoga). In a number of interpretations, these 'two worlds' co-exist 
(Loy, 1988). They are seen as two as long as the uneducated mind engages with them 
(Olendzki, 2011, p. 68). Hence the problem we have is that our uneducated mind 
engages with the appearances and creates the cave. Liberation from 'the cave' is the 
liberation from the ignorance of our own mind. It is thus far less clear here whether 
objects have an ontological status without a mind that perceives them.  
(3) The third Noble Truth – nibbana – is a term that connotes diverse meanings including 
Truth, cessation of dukkha, 'extinguishing of desires' and others (Rahula, 1959). When the 
'fire' of our cravings is extinguished, or perhaps seen as an impersonal constant flux that 
ceases to be that which guides our actions, the cave will cease to exist with it. Perhaps the 
most important thing to understand here is that the meaning of a realization of the nature of 
appearances as insubstantial is automatically a realization of the nature of the insubstantiality 
of the seer of appearances. The 'self' that confuses appearances with things as such, confuses 
itself as a 'thing as such'. Enlightenment may thus be seen as the realization of the 
insubstantiality of knower and known, thus contrasting Plato's dualism with a non-dual 
epistemology. 
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Nibbana constitutes the ideal of 'the educated person' that is reflected in a mind that has 
recovered from the human dis-ease of ignorance. This would be the equivalent of the 
philosopher's escaping the cave and knowing the 'good'. This points to a clear affinity 
between the Buddha and Plato that both viewed knowledge and virtue as unified. However, 
we believe that the Buddha would be more explicit in viewing knowledge as the means and 
virtue as its educational aim, given his anti-intellectualism manifested in a resistance to 
engage in metaphysical-philosophical discourse when it was not clearly linked to the 
liberation from suffering (see Gombrich, 2009).  
(4) The Fourth Noble truth – magga (path) – may be likened to the Buddha's curriculum. This 
curriculum is the eightfold path that culminates in the unification of wisdom and compassion. 
It is also known as the 'middle path' for it stems from the Buddha's own experience from 
which he concluded that liberation will be achieved neither by extreme austerity nor by 
indulgence in sense pleasures (Rahula, 1959, p. 45). Importantly, the emphasis on the human 
condition as dependent on how we perceive (from the mind in here), far more than on that 
which is perceived (out there), proposes a substantial shift in our perspective about education. 
Education becomes primarily an individual's commitment to the purification of his or her 
own mind. The metaphorical journey out of the cave is understood as a path of the 
purification of the mind and its recovery from an epistemological error.  
When the mind is transformed so that it awakens from the spell of avijja we are said to 
embody: Right Understanding, Right thought, Right speech, Right action, Right livelihood, 
Right effort, Right mindfulness, and Right concentration. This eightfold path is 
conventionally grouped into ethics (sila), mental discipline (samadhi) and wisdom (panna). 
In Buddhist terms, Plato's 'good' (the sun), is expressed in the unification of wisdom (panna) 
and compassion (karuna) that can be seen both as expressions of the purification of the mind, 
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and as the pedagogical means for realizing this aim. Wisdom and compassion that must 
reciprocally balance each other (Rahula, 1959, p. 46) are expressed in self-less action, 
altruism and benevolence. The path that leads from self-centeredness of a mind that confuses 
things 'as such' with things as the mind itself perceives, to a mind that dispels the 'self' around 
which it had centered, will be inclined to wise and compassionate action. Such action would 
perhaps manifest in the return of the philosopher to the cave after enlightenment and 
transform this solitary act into a deeply ethical and socially-engaged endeavor. Such indeed, 
is at least the ethos of Mahayana Buddhism that posed the role model of the bodhisattva – 
one who engages in the Buddhist path, attains enlightenment and dedicates his or her life to 
the liberation of all sentient beings based on endless compassion. This socially-engaged ethos 
has become one of the central themes within contemporary Buddhism and within its 
educational interpretations (Eppert et al, 2015; Hattam, 2004). 
Given the contemporary interest in mindfulness practice, we offer some reflections on the 
place of mindfulness within the Buddhist tradition and comment on the relation of these 
practices to philosophy of education. As was noted earlier, Right mindfulness is the seventh 
constituent of an eightfold path that spans the full gamut of ethical living. However, the 
exponential rise in scientific research of the benefits of mindfulness practice and its growing 
incorporation in diverse educational settings (recently depicted in the Handbook of 
mindfulness in education (Schonert-Reichl & Roeser, 2016)) has paradoxically led to both a 
growing awareness to and a hiding of, its Buddhist origins (Ergas, 2014). Philosophers of 
education have been responding to this movement in diverse ways that position Buddhism at 
the center of contemporary debates. This includes the appeal to Buddhism as a tradition from 
which to elucidate and rejuvenate educational practice (Eppert et al, 2015; Todd, 2015) as 
well as a critical response to what has been derogatorily termed the 'McMindfulness' 
phenomenon (Purser & Loy, 2013) – the extraction of mindfulness from its Buddhist ethos 
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and hence its transformation into a school 'pathology proofing practice' (O'Donnell, 2015). 
We believe this field will continue to develop in the coming years. 
 
2.2 Hinduism through the case of Classical yoga: absorbed in the cave to seek liberation 
Of the diversity of belief systems that go under the term ‘Hinduism’ (e.g., advaita Vedanta, 
Purva Mimamsa, Shaivism) we will focus only on Patanjali’s classical yoga for two main 
reasons: a) This tradition will be more familiar to the reader given the pervasiveness of yoga 
practice in Western industrialized countries as well as its contemporary applications within 
schools. b) Of all four traditions discussed here, we suspect that classical yoga would be the 
one closest to the fundamental views presented in Plato’s cave allegory. 
Our analysis will be based on Patanjali’s yogasutra, a text containing 196 aphorisms dated 
arguably to the 3rd or 4th century CE. This text, written by a sage named Patanjali of which 
very little is known, is a compilation of diverse traditions of Patanjali’s times. Essentially, 
like the cave allegory it provides us with a full worldview, along with a path toward an 
Absolute Truth, broadly understood here as an educational path. 
2.2.1 A dualist worldview 
Most interpreters understand classical yoga as depicting a dualistic ontology-epistemology 
(Feuerstein, 2001; Iyengar, 1993; Larson, 1987).4 Such interpretation immediately locates us 
within the context of Plato's cave allegory. By pointing to the distinctions between these two 
forms of dualism, we will be able to inform our understanding of both perspectives. The 
dualism of classical yoga lies between objective nature (Prakriti), and subjectivity - the Seer 
                                                     
4 It is however important to note Whicher (1998) as a critic of such position. 
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or Self (Purusha).5 Nature, is the phenomenal. It is comprised of basic elements known as the 
three gunas - tamas, rajas and sattva. The three are never in balance hence the phenomenal 
world is in constant flux in which things are tied in a chain of causality. The Seer, however, is 
of an entirely different ilk. It is beyond Nature, which means it is unconditioned, eternal, and 
never changing. 
The most important thing to understand here is our own makings in this setting. A human 
being comprises of both Nature and the Seer. Supposedly, this would align well with Plato’s 
or Descartes’s body/mind dualism, yet that is where yoga offers a substantially different 
position. Thoughts, sensations, emotions, and feelings that are associated conventionally with 
the mind and the body, all belong to Nature. They are all objects that can be observed and 
essentially are no different from the desktop or the paper at which you are looking. They are 
not our True identity that is, "…the transcendental Self, Spirit, or pure Awareness, as 
opposed to the finite personality." (Feuerstein, 2001, p. 458). The 'finite personality' that we 
experience normally in our day-to-day life is nothing but Nature, which has absolutely 
nothing to do with the Seer/Self. In fact, the aim of yoga is this very realization. 
2.2.2 The human condition and its problem 
The ‘educational’ problem here is mistaking the phenomenal with the Real, a concern that is 
clearly shared by Patanjali and Socrates. The affinities however, are deeper for in both cases 
the educational path is grounded in the fact that wrong epistemology-ontology cannot but 
result in unethical action in the world. In this sense, both Patanjali and Socrates were 
concerned with correcting our misperception so that moral living will flow from the knowing 
of Truth. However, given the different views on the kind of dualism involved here, the error 
is conceptualized differently, and the 'educative' path differs.   
                                                     
5 The translations of prakriti/purusha vary (Feuerstein, 2001; Iyengar, 1993) 
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According to yoga, the layperson travels in the world with the sense that he or she is seeing 
reality as such (as the prisoners in the cave) yet in effect he or she is looking through a 
Nature-mind through which all one can see is a Nature phenomenal reality. The mind is 
trapped in a hall of mirrors that it takes to be Real. Every sense perception seen out there 
invokes a movement in here that is owned by a Nature mind that conceives of this experience 
as ‘my’ experience. Prosaically put, if, for example, someone insults or flatters you, you 
perceive it based on your Nature-mind, and understand their words as referring to your ‘real’ 
identity. You then feel the insult and react, or feel the palpitation and rash resulting from that 
person's flattery, and you react to that. You would think of this as reality as such, yet classical 
yoga states that it is all simply a phenomenal world governed by causality and change – an 
endless drama of constant emotional turmoil with no way out.  
The problem then, very much like in Buddhism, is human suffering and how it can be 
overcome. Overcoming suffering in yoga's case will result from disengaging from a false 
identification with Nature, and dwelling in the Seer. This is the gateway to perceiving the 
Real, which is nothing like this drama that is created by the interplay of a mind that is part of 
the world of appearances. What we see here then is a clear affinity between Patanjali's yoga 
and the educative path of the cave allegory as we understand both to be concerned with a 
shift from identifying with the phenomenal, changing and tangible world to that of the 
eternal, unchanging and intangible world. At least conceptually speaking the Real that 
Patanjali speaks of would seem to resemble the eternal and unchanging world of forms that 
are outside the Platonic cave. However, this is where the affinity ends as we show by 
examining the educational path of yoga. 
2.2.3 The educational yogic path 
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In contrast to Plato’s allegory, Patanjali would by no means count on philosophizing as an 
educative path toward escaping the cave. This can be clearly shown by turning to the 
yogasutra itself. ‘Yoga’, Patanjali (2001) tells us in sutra I.2, ‘is the restriction of the 
fluctuation of consciousness’,6 and in I.3 ‘then the Seer abides in its essential form’. What are 
these ‘fluctuations of consciousness’? Patanjali elaborates in sutras I.5-11 (p. 218): they 
include sense impressions, thoughts, ideation, cognition, memory, psychic activity – pretty 
much all mental activity with which a mortal human being would be familiar (Feuerstein, 
2001; Raveh, 2012). Strangely, even ‘right knowledge’ is included here. Patanjali lists it 
alongside: error, metaphor, deep sleep and memory. Our highest reasoning and logical 
argumentation – essentially the activity and results of philosophizing as we tend to 
understand it - are still considered by Classical yoga's ontology to be 'fluctuations of 
consciousness' that belong to Nature. While yoga will clearly distinguish between 'higher' 
ideation that is the result of buddhi (roughly equivalent to Plato's Reason) and a lower mind 
(manas) based on which we engage with the world reflecting our desirous nature, both will 
remain Nature's manifestations (Feuerstein, 2001 p. 240; Iyengar 1993, p. 35). As such, they 
are a hindrance to the realization that the yogi seeks. In other words, the escape from the 
Platonic cave, mythical as it already is, is nothing even remotely close to our highest 
imagination. The highest realization and ultimate goal of yoga is to stop all mental activity 
including the most philosophically-rigorous (Raveh, 2012, p. 26). Only by the stopping of 
such internal motion can the unchanging Absolute truth be revealed, as the Seer is not moved 
by Nature. The state of such realization is kaivalya – 'aloneness' that Muller (1899, p. 309) 
viewed as separation between Seer and seen. While the Sanskrit word for yoga is derived 
from the verb yug translated as integration, what the yogi is in fact after, is a separation from 
Nature, and a full identification with the Seer – an utter content-less awareness. 
                                                     
6 We use Feuerstein’s translation. See Patanjali (2001). 
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What we see here is a complete mistrust of conceptualization and language. It is clear then 
that some other means must be proposed for our liberation. Indeed, the yogic postures with 
which many may be familiar emerge as one alternative vehicle for such a path. Yet this 
familiar aspect of the yogic path is in fact, only one limb (anga) out of eight that constitute 
the yogic path (ashtanga yoga) that are elaborated in yogastura II.29 (Patanjali 2001, p. 224) 
and include moral precepts, practices of purification, postures (asanas), breath exercises 
(pranayama), disengagement of the senses and three phases of growing concentration within 
meditation. With the exception of the moral precepts that are associated with the yogi’s moral 
conduct with his own self and with others, these practices constitute an austere regime that 
the yogi practices on his own or with a Guru. In a most paradoxical twist, at least 
traditionally, liberation awaits the yogi not by climbing outside the cave but rather by 
deliberately entering the (Himalayan) cave and working directly with the mind that again, 
like in Buddhism, seems to be responsible for the creation of the cave of misperception.7  
Patanjali's yogasutra points to the uncanny not only in its trajectory of a mystical experience 
but also in its third part (2001, pp. 226-230) that discusses magical spiritual powers (siddhis) 
that the yogi will gain through practice. Nevertheless, contemporary yoga practice is a 
pervasive phenomenon and its growing applications in schools as well as the scientific 
research of this domain are becoming noticeable.8 We believe that this, like the growing 
pervasiveness of mindfulness practice, along with concerns of over-commercialization and 
the transposing of a practice from its origins warrant a serious engagement for philosophers 
of education. It is specifically here, and perhaps in Daoism that appears next, that we find a 
fruitful direction for such engagement in exploring what has become the 'trademark' of 
                                                     
7 I acknowledge Daniel Raveh for this idea that he suggested in a personal correspondence. 
8 In this context, it should be noted that the interpretation offered here follows more of a mythical orientation, 
which highlights the yogi as retreating from the world. However, contemporary interpretations have opposed 
this orientation, stressing the yogi as a socially-engaged being, highlighting the moral precepts as well as 
postural yoga as socially-oriented ethics (Iyengar, 1993; Whicher, 1998) 
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contemporary yoga practice – postures and their educative role.9 Contemporary yoga 
authorities in this domain elaborate how the body can be viewed as a vehicle for education in 
ethics based on postural practice grounded in yoga texts (Iyengar, 2005). This orientation 
combined with contemporary accounts of the body (Shusterman, 2008) appears to provide a 
substantial path toward the further analysis of educational theory and practice as some have 
begun demonstrate (Helberg, Heyes & Rohel, 2009; Martin & Ergas, 2016). 
 
2.3 Daoism: following the way out of the cave 
Daoism presents a particular challenge to the approach taken in this chapter. Unlike 
Buddhism and Yoga which allow for relatively systematic discussions and can to some extent 
be rendered in educational terms while also being read with and against the cave allegory, 
Daoism resists such systematization. Of all four traditions discussed here, it is perhaps the 
most distant from Plato's cave, and hence from the world of a 'Western' reader. We will 
nevertheless attempt to provide some kind of a coherent picture, within a worldview that 
thrives on paradox. 
2.3.1 The human condition 
The human condition for Daoism is simply one of unity with the Dao, the ‘way’ of nature. 
The Dao, way, or path, could be understood as a way out of the cave into the light of real 
understanding. The Daoist sage would then be the wise figure who assists the student in 
finding the way out the cave, of distinguishing truth from error, with truth being understood 
as following the way, and error being a willful departure from it. However, this dualistic 
interpretation which suggests a division between the real and the illusory (or right and wrong 
                                                     
9 Of the 196 versus of Patanjali's yogasutra only two focus on this aspect. This is hence a development of 
later texts. 
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paths) is somewhat foreign to the Daoist way. This is partly because the Dao refers not just to 
the way or path but also to the ultimate source of all. It is the source of both the darkness and 
the light, the yin and yang as classical Chinese cosmology sees it.  In a certain sense, Dao 
contains all, and departure from it is illusory. So, if departure from the true way is illusory 
then the dualism between appearances and realities in Plato’s allegory is also, in a sense, 
insubstantial. The achievement of Dao is, paradoxically, through non-achievement or non-
action, through simplicity, spontaneity and unity with the Dao. This unity resists ideas of 
becoming, growing, or developing, images that education often assumes. To come to a clear 
conceptual grasp of all of this might be to miss the point since, as the first line of Daoism’s 
central text, the Daodejing states, “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao.” 10 
2.3.2 The way of learning 
It is common to contrast Daoism’s lack of explicit moral precepts with the Confucian 
emphasis on virtue, ritual and social order. However, this might be a rather too philosophical 
interpretation to Daoism. Some have argued that morality plays a more important role within 
Daoism than typical readings of the Daodejing would suggest (Palmer 1991, p. 11). Other 
texts, such as the T’ai Shang Kan Ying P’ien (The Writings of the Exalted One on Response 
and Retribution), extols the Daoist to the right path, and speaks of the dangers of proceeding 
on an evil path. But on the whole, Daoism seems to be more concerned to deconstruct the 
idea of ethical systems implicit within philosophical paths and images of Platonic ascent. So, 
although Dao can be seen as playing a role similar to eudaimonia (human flourishing) in 
ancient Greek thinking (Yu 2007) – as a regulative ideal – it can also be read as primarily 
descriptive, not requiring conformity to a particular path or set of virtues, indicating that the 
path is inscribed in the activities of the world (both human and non-human). Particularly 
within the writings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, we find a non-dualist recognition that, just 
                                                     
10 The Feng and English translation is here used. See Lao Tzu (2011). 
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as water flows downwards, so all of nature, including human beings, follow the rhythms of 
the Dao.  
The idea that the ethical way is a natural expression of the Dao might seem to negate the need 
for becoming, or indeed for learning. In one sense, attending to the Dao is the principle mode 
of learning, even though sages can assist with the sensitivity and attention required for that 
learning. Ignorance, from the Daoist perspective, is more of a resistance or insensitivity to the 
Dao. But in fact, Daoists engage in a more subversive and playful logic in order to break 
open common ideas about progress, development, knowledge and learning. Our expectations 
are challenged in order to reveal the rationalist framings that encumber human thought and 
action. Thus ideas of progress and advancement (through learning or otherwise) have always 
struck a discordant note within Daoism. In contrast to Confucian ideas where learning is 
more an acquisitive and positive process, Daoist learning entails an emptying or even 
‘unlearning’, an idea that resonates with Socrates practices of aporia. As chapter 48 of the 
Daodejing, states, 
In the pursuit of learning, every day something is acquired. 
In the pursuit of Tao, every day something is dropped. 
 
Less and less is done 
Until non-action is achieved. 
When nothing is done, nothing is left undone. 
 
The world is ruled by letting things take their course. 
It cannot be ruled by interfering. 
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This image of emptying, or doing nothing, is reminiscent of Socratic ignorance, which could 
be interpreted as liberation from a kind of false image of a self who is able to acquire 
knowledge. Learning is not a process of accumulation because the Dao resists reification into 
representational or conceptual knowledge. The practice that Daoism advocates is known as 
wu-wei, non-action. This is not simply passivity, but rather letting Dao regulate activity. 
Thus, the emptiness of wu-wei entails harmony with the Dao. This realization of learning 
seems to anticipate concerns about the dependencies and deficits implied in ideas about 
learning and teaching. The acquisition of knowledge through a planned educational process is 
an impediment to the Dao and so the image of ascent out of the cave towards a particular 
conception of knowing could be misleading. Daoist knowledge (zhi) is more akin to 
mastering, a mastering that – in typical Daoist rhetoric – must be achieved without mastering. 
This means that the world is not an object to be mastered by a knowledgeable subject, but 
that mastery is achieved through letting the Dao into itself through non-action (Moeller 2004, 
112). Practising wu wei, the Daoist submits to the Dao, thereby achieving mastery without 
mastery. Becoming less, Daoist learning is as much unlearning.  
2.3.3 Daoism as non-dual 
Within the unity of the Dao, there are tensions and changes, expressed in the cyclical 
movement of the Yin/Yang which, although perceived as an irreconcilable duality (i.e. a 
world of appearances), appears ultimately as complementary and interdependent: hence 
ontologically non-dual. Consequently, although it is possible not to be aligned with the flow 
of the Dao, ethical concepts such as failure, wrongdoing, or lack of resolution seem out of 
place. No wonder, then, that Daoism, like Confucianism, is sometimes said to be quietist or 
fatalist in orientation. Since it emphasizes a kind of naturalism, Daoism has an intrinsic 
suspicion of human rationality which reflects the performative conception of language it 
assumes. Feng Youlan, of the ‘New Daoist’ school claims a trans-rationality for Daoism 
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(rather than irrational or a-rational) aligning mystical ideas of negativity that transcend the 
categories of conceptual reasoning (and has therefore been compared with Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger) (Moeller 2004, 22-24). More than anything, overthinking marks humanity’s 
separation from nature, a separation that paradoxically is insubstantial, even unreal. Learning 
to live with and as nature is, then, centrally Daoist, a learning to become nothing. But the 
non-dualist tension with dualism recurs since, in a sense, we can do no other than be who we 
are. Human action, whether gentle or violent, rational or trans-rational expresses itself as part 
of the Dao. If Plato’s image of the ascent out of the cave to become fully human is interpreted 
as a progressive ascent from ignorance to knowledge, it seems at odds with the non-dual 
acknowledgement that everything is already part of the Dao. Conventional readings of the 
allegory presuppose the very idea of separation that Daoists would not recognize. By 
contrast, then, for Daoists the cave might be seen as a suitable dwelling place. This might 
accord well with other philosophies of education that resist a developmental or progressive 
view of childhood, as the preparation for adulthood, where childhood and adulthood are 
simply phases of a flow, rather than hierarchically organized. Still, Daoism calls for a 
sensitivity to the world and the rhythms that guide it.  
Although Daoism tends to avoid extremism, legends of ingesting precious substances such as 
jade, cinnabar, and gold, in the pursuit of longevity might seem at odds with the naturalism of 
the Dao. Within the history of Daoism, the Daoist quest for immortality has sometimes been 
understood as a more literal pursuit than Buddhist liberation or Hindu Moksha, revealing the 
apparently inescapable need to define human existence in terms of a lack. Here Plato’s ascent 
imagery is more clearly relevant, where immortality is the unchanging world. The Dao can be 
followed through meditative and physical practices, which are often intermixed. The 
traditional lineages of Daoist practitioners suggest an important aspect of Eastern pedagogy 
not much discussed: the relative importance of oral and direct transmission in contrast to the 
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reliance of the written word in the West. Space prevents fuller discussion here of that vital 
aspect of Eastern pedagogy, though drawing attention to the efforts of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) to destroy that history by cutting that direct link to the lineages of 
great Daoist masters should encourage us to pay attention to the important recovery of 
Daoism (and even more of Confucianism) within China today. Across the world, the Daoist 
traditions and pedagogies are conveyed through the practices of Tai Chi Chuan, Chi Gung 
and other related practices, many of which seem to fuse the development of wu wei with 
practices of longevity. The challenge for the future may be to ensure the popularized ‘new 
age’ or ‘perrenialist’ Western appropriations of Daoist ideas which tend to reduce Daoism to 
universal system of self-help and cultivation, are able to reconnect with the more established 
and ancient traditions. Daoist ideas around cultivation of virtue should be given more 
attention by educationalists (Culham 2015). 
 
2.4 Confucius: the superior path from the cave 
2.4.1 The human condition 
Taking pleasure in learning is a principle assumption of Confucius’ most well-known text, 
the Analects (Confucius 1893, 1: 1). It seems to be a natural aspect of human nature to take 
pleasure in the cultivation of the self by being respectful to others, particularly elders 
(Confucius 1893, 14: 42). This is one reason why Confucianism is often characterized as 
hierarchical and authoritarian, entailing the attenuation of critical thinking in favor of 
deference. Education might then be less as an emergence from the cave than being contained 
by it, or even dragged into it. Following the 1978 reforms in China, Western educators are 
reported to have found Chinese teaching and learning practices that “contrasted markedly 
with current Western practice, though not necessarily with much earlier Western practice. 
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These included teacher-centered whole class teaching, very large classes, apparent passivity 
on the part of learners with low levels of active learner participation, and much use of 
teacher-led chanting, rote-learning and mimetic methods” (Starr 2012, 4). Images of mass 
education anywhere in the world lend Plato’s allegory a figurative realism that is striking. 
However, recent changes in Chinese social, cultural and economic circumstances suggest 
these characterizations to be at best outdated, though more likely neo-colonial impositions 
and misrepresentations. Several scholars of Chinese thought and Confucianism have recently 
argued that these perceptions distort our understanding of both ancient and modern 
pedagogical approaches in China and that Confucian thought is not by any means antithetical 
to critical inquiry (Tan 2013; Kim 2003; Starr 2012). It is no surprise, then, that scholars have 
found similarities between the political and social interests of philosophers such as Dewey 
and Plato to resonate with Confucian theory, encouraging a revision and revival of interest in 
it (Sim 2009; Tan 2016). 
The similarities between Confucius (551 to 479 BCE) and Socrates (470 to 399 BCE) are 
particularly notable. Both lived at similar times and despite neither writing anything down, 
they had enormous influence on Eastern and Western philosophical traditions respectively. 
Understanding the need for rights to balance with social obligations is a common theme 
between Plato and Confucius (Dionisio 2014, 42). For Confucius, it is for the purpose of 
service to the state, in harmony with the individual, that education primarily exists. This order 
is expressed both through the harmony of the cosmos and those within it, again suggesting a 
correlation between the concerns of ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers (Wolf 1999). 
2.4.2 Confucian education 
The primary educational goal of Confucian education and central to the general philosophy is 
the development of Junzi, which has been translated as ‘gentlemen’, ‘superior person’, or the 
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ethically well-cultivated person. Clearly the image of escape from Plato’s cave can be 
associated with realization of Junzi which can be regarded as the goal of Confucian life. In 
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE), five principles of virtue were established on the basis 
of Confucian thought which have been influential: humaneness or benevolence (ren), 
righteousness or justice (yi), wisdom or knowledge (zhi), integrity or honesty (Xin), and 
ceremony or proper rite (li). This list might not look so out of place in an Aristotelian context. 
But a central component of virtue that will seem rather foreign to modern readers is that of 
‘proper rite’, li. Approaching the world with appropriate sensitivity to rite, ceremony, or 
propriety might seem related to convention or custom rather than a question of morality, 
since “it is by the Rules of Propriety that the character is established” (Analects 8: 8). One 
explanation for this concern for rite could be the expectation that education should primarily 
serve to develop an elite rank of officials and civil servants in order to administer a large and 
enduring empire, a concern that correlates with Plato’s description of the guardian class in 
The Republic. It could be argued that Confucius’ concern for rite performs a social and civil 
function making administration in those circumstances more effective. But to regard rite as 
only a historical contingency would miss the deeper links between humanism, harmony, and 
hierarchy which define the core of Confucian thought (Storr 2012, 8). There is ongoing 
debate about whether rite (li) stands in an instrumental relation to the core virtue of 
humaneness (Ren) (Li 2007), but even if Ren is the principle virtue, the order and respect of li 
is not incidental. Performance of rites with the appropriate level of respect is suggestive of a 
virtue in and of itself. In relation to this propriety, traditional Chinese culture regards the 
elders, parents or rulers with particular deference, strikingly illustrated by the concept of 
teaching itself. 
The Chinese character 教 jiao, which means to teach, is composed of 孝 xiao ‘filial piety’ 
plus the causative element 文. In other words, to teach can be literally understood as being ‘to 
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cause someone to be filially pious’ (Storr 2012, 8). Thus, Junzi requires a virtue that Western 
educational theorists tend to avoid: filial piety. Little wonder, then, that Chinese education 
systems are sometimes characterized as less concerned with critical thinking and as lacking in 
egalitarian principles. While there are examples of educated women in Confucian history, for 
example Ban Zhao (45-115 CE) (Berthrong & Berthrong 2000, 70), in general the 
conceptions of authority, piety and deference appear to have encouraged traditional roles for 
men and women within a larger social hierarchy (Galtung and Stenslie 2014, chapter 37). Of 
course these issues are not unique to Confucianism. It is also worth keeping in mind that filial 
piety extends to the state as a whole, which, in this context seems to include everything that is 
beneath heaven. In other words, the virtues of the family are also virtues of the state, and of 
the cosmos itself. 
Considering again Plato’s cave, this account of Confucian moral education may strike one as 
remaining in the cave rather than stepping into the light of truth. But, of course, this very 
much depends upon one’s conception of the allegory. The development of Junzi through Li, 
Ren and the other virtues can certainly be framed in terms of the ascent of the individual out 
of the cave, and despite the misgivings about the patriarchy and deference, play a role in 
establishing the proper ordering of things such that truth can prevail. While Confucians may 
be less concerned with metaphysical and ontological questions of truth vs. appearance, the 
ethical and spiritual ordering of the cosmos through the development of virtues can at least 
suggest some important connections between a Confucian and a Platonic cosmology. 
 
PART 3 
3. Towards an ‘Eastern’ philosophy of education? 
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Reading with and against Plato to examine Eastern philosophy of education has revealed 
certain interesting tensions between: knowledge and ignorance; subjective and objective; 
nature and culture; dualism and non-dualism. Put simply, we have explored whether the cave 
is suggestive of a state of illusion or ignorance and whether what is at stake is both 
epistemological and ontological. One wonders whether analytical distinctions between 
knowing and being can be upheld, or whether the compression into non-dualism makes the 
distinction untenable.  
To be human is to know. The prisoners cannot resist knowing, but their knowledge is of 
shadows framed by unknowing or ignorance. To understand our own ignorance is an 
important insight that cuts across Plato and these four traditions. Differences between the 
cave allegory and the diverse traditions are in many cases reflected in the substantiality of 
knower and its/his/her conceptualization.  
Knowing is being, an idea that is most evident in questions around understanding the good 
life. Knowledge of virtue can only be practiced, having little or no substantial reality in a 
purely intellectual realm. In this sense, we detect a less intellectualist approach within the 
traditions reviewed in comparison to Plato. That is, most notably in Daoism and in Buddhism 
as well, there is a preference for the one who acts virtuously even if he or she would not be 
able to justify their virtue based on philosophical argumentation. This clearly points to a 
perspective that is characteristic of these traditions that are more suspicious as to the relation 
between language and world (a theme that had taken center stage only in later developments 
in Western philosophy). This is most famously captured in Eastern aphorisms such as: “When 
the wise man points at the Moon, the idiot looks at the finger” as well as “Those who know 
do not speak”. 
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It is thus clear that an educational path that follows in the footsteps of these traditions will 
rely on a curricular-pedagogical approach that addresses the human mind based on means 
that are other than conceptualization and in fact attempt to ameliorate, reduce or even stop 
this tendency at least for certain periods of time. Meditation, yogic postures, tai chi, 
compassion meditation and other contemplative practices, engaged in solitude or in 
communion, can be viewed as pedagogies that follow this orientation. They seek to detach 
the practitioner from identifying necessarily with a reason-based substantial knower 
characteristic of Plato-Descartes-Kant and appeal to a body-heart-mind as an insubstantial 
process of knowing. They bring into view the possibility of direct pedagogy, sometimes 
wordless, sometimes unwritten, and often at the fringes of language. Although 20th century 
phenomenology draws us somewhat closer to this kind of engagement with philosophy of 
education (Lewin 2015), nevertheless a leap may still remain as those working from the 
position of Eastern traditions are required to mobilize the uncanniness of a post or pre-
discursive meditative experience to the world of philosophical argumentation.  
Overall, we find that the four traditions reviewed very briefly in this chapter open an 
incredibly rich and nuanced terrain for the future of philosophy of education. This applies to 
the analysis of the curricular-pedagogical approaches that are proposed by them as well as to 
the substantially different premises from which these traditions engage in the understanding 
of human existence and its aims. The current contemplative turn in education and the 
emergence of a 'post-secular age' may be signs that this orientation will prove both fruitful 
and necessary for the further development of the field (Ergas, 2017; Lewin 2016).   
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